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COMMENTS
REGULATING FROM THE GROUND UP: CONTROLLING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WITH BANK
WORKERS’ UNIONS
We would have conference calls with regional presidents and
managers . . . on how to word our selling points so the customer
can’t say no. I felt like a cheat. I started losing sleep and got nauseous every Sunday night over the start of the next workweek.
—Ashlie S.
I had to tell [my bosses] why I didn’t force [customers] into opening that third, fourth, fifth checking account . . . . I had to explain
why I did not feel comfortable with pushing people into paying for
something they did not need. I was so stressed out, I developed shingles.
—Dennise C.
There were numerous days where I would hide in the men’s bathroom crying. It got so bad that one day I left work to go to the emergency room because I thought I was having a heart attack. It turns
out it was an anxiety attack.
—Scott T. 1

1. These are the words of three former Wells Fargo employees describing their experiences at various regional branches of the bank between 2005 and 2016. Stacy Cowley, Voices
from Wells Fargo: ‘I Thought I Was Having a Heart Attack,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/business/dealbook/voices-from-wells-fargo-i-thoughti-was-having-a-heart-attack.html [https://perma.cc/QRV7-AX33].
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ABSTRACT
In the Wells Fargo accounts scandal, millions of banking accounts were created for customers without their consent. The scandal cost Wells Fargo customers millions of dollars in direct and indirect charges. Investigations revealed that employees were
pressured into creating these false accounts through abusive banking practices promulgated from the top. These practices are not
unique to Wells Fargo; instead, they are ubiquitous in the financial
services industry.
Current financial regulations do not adequately address how to
mitigate banks’ harmful practices. This comment explores the premise that bank worker unionization could serve as a much-needed
check on the power of financial institutions and the directors and
officers who run them. The comment provides an overview of why
large financial institutions are incentivized to engage in harmful
and economically unsound banking practices. The comment then
outlines the potential for unions to constrain abusive commercial
banking interests and recounts current efforts to unionize bank
workers. Finally, the comment argues that threats to dismantle current consumer protection enforcement and banking regulations call
for a new, worker-centered approach to hold financial institutions
accountable to the public.
INTRODUCTION
On September 8, 2016, Wells Fargo paid fines totaling $185 million to the city of Los Angeles and federal regulators to settle allegations that its employees used coercion, deception, and falsified
information to open millions of unauthorized bank accounts for its
customers. 2 By the bank’s own estimates, these practices resulted
in the opening of 3.5 million unauthorized accounts across the
country, 190,000 of which incurred fees and charges. 3 The sham
2. Associated Press, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million on Phony Accounts, Fires 5,300
Staff, NBC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2016, 3:45 PM EDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/busin
ess-news/wells-fargo-fined-185-million-improper-account-openings-n645031 [http://perma.c
c/77XU-APRU]. Specifically, Wells Fargo paid $100 million to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, $35 million to the Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency, and $50 million to the City and County of Los Angeles. Id.
3. Associated Press, Wells Fargo Now Says 3.5 Million Affected by Sales Scandal, Up
from 2.1 Million, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 31, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
business/ct-wells-fargo-fake-accounts-20170831-story.html [https://perma.cc/88CL-SE2D].
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accounts cost Wells Fargo customers over $142 million in direct
charges and damaged credit scores. 4 In April 2017, the bank admitted that its fraudulent tactics dated back to 2002. 5
The longstanding and systemic nature of Wells Fargo’s practices
strongly suggests that the bank’s executives not only tacitly condoned such nefarious behavior on the part of its sales associates,
but also intentionally designed a recklessly aggressive sales culture to increase the bank’s profits. 6 Nonetheless, several days after
Wells Fargo paid its massive penalties, former CEO John Stumpf
refused to take personal responsibility for the scandal. 7 Instead of
laying the blame with the bank’s executive policymakers, Stumpf
blamed a few “bad apples.” 8 Specifically, Stumpf pointed to the
4. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo’s $142-Million Sham Accounts Settlement: What
You Need to Know, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2017, 2:55 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business
/la-fi-wells-fargo-settlement-20170710-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/HBP7-CGFK].
5. Wells Fargo Admits Account Scandal Dates Back to 2002, N.Y. POST (Apr. 21, 2017,
2:22 PM), https://nypost.com/2017/04/21/wells-fargo-admits-account-scandal-dates-back-to2002/ [https://perma.cc/GN2M-L8EQ].
6. See Associated Press, supra note 2; Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with
Wells Fargo, NEW YORKER (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
the-record-fine-against-wells-fargo-points-to-the-failure-of-regulation [http://perma.cc/G25
H-MZV7] (“[Opening fake accounts] was so widespread around the country that it would be
a truly remarkable coincidence if each team member had come up with the strategy independently.”). In April 2017, a board of independent directors at Wells Fargo found that former chairman and CEO, John Stumpf, along with the former head of community banking,
Carrie Tolstedt, were primarily responsible for the “high-pressure sales culture” at the
bank. Wilfred Frost & Dawn Giel, Wells Fargo Board Slams Former CEO Stumpf and Tolstedt, Claws Back $75 Million, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2017, 7:30 AM ET), https://www.cnbc.com/
2017/04/10/wells-fargo-board-slams-stumpf-and-tolstedt-claws-back-millions.html [http://
perma.cc/VLZ2-W8E9]; see also Peter Dreier, The Feisty Group That Exposed Wells Fargo’s
Wrongdoing, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 13, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/feisty-group-ex
posed-wells-fargo%E2%80%99s-wrongdoing [https://perma.cc/AUC9-DLD7].
7. See Press Release, Commc’n Workers of Am., United States Senate Banking Committee Grills Wells Fargo CEO on Damaging Sales Practices (Sept. 22, 2016), https:// www.
cwa-union.org/news/us-senate-banking-committee-grills-wells-fargo-ceo-on-damaging-sales
-practices [https://perma.cc/9R9Q-TBUK]. Senator Elizabeth Warren’s now-infamous grilling of Stumpf included such highlights as:
You kept your job, you kept your multi-million dollar bonuses, and you went
on television to blame thousands of $12-an-hour employees who were just trying to meet cross-sell quotas that made you rich. You should resign, you should
give back the money that you took while this scam was going on, and you
should be criminally investigated.
Id.
8. Lucinda Shen, Former Wells Fargo Employees to CEO John Stumpf: It’s Not Our
Fault, FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/19/former-wells-fargo-employe
es-to-ceo-john-stumpf-its-not-our-fault/ [https://perma.cc/3AFK-GYPP]; see also Riley
McDermid, Wells Fargo CEO Blames Bank’s Recent Woe’s on Rogue Employees, Not Systemic
Problems, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2016, 7:00 PDT), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfranc
isco/news/2016/09/14/wells-fargo-ceo-blames-rogue-employees-scandal-wfc.html [https://per
ma.cc/P3RW-X9XT].
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5300 low-level employees that Wells Fargo fired in September 2016
for “engaging in [i]mproper [s]ales [p]ractices.” 9 He insisted that
these employees were anomalous bad actors, emphasizing that
“[t]here was no incentive to do bad things” at Wells Fargo, 10 and
that the bank “never directed nor wanted [its] team members to
provide products and services to customers that they did not
want.” 11
Former employees painted a starkly different picture of Wells
Fargo’s sales directives. Stumpf’s mantra was “eight is great,”
which meant that sales associates and bankers should strive to sell
eight products to each and every customer, an aggressive form of a
common business practice known as “cross-selling.” 12 Workers
were pressured to report new sales to their supervisors every few
hours and open as many as twenty accounts a day. 13 Desperate for
sales, low-level managers instructed employees to sell accounts to
their friends and family members. 14 Harried bankers convinced
customers to open travel checking accounts by telling them that it
was unsafe to travel without them. 15 Sales associates were also

9. Matt Levine, Opinion, Wells Fargo Opened a Couple Million Fake Accounts,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 9, 2016, 6:30 AM EDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/201609-09/wells-fargo-opened-a-couple-million-fake-accounts [https://perma.cc/VPE4-ANW7].
10. Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, Wells Fargo CEO Defends Bank Culture, Lays
Blame with Bad Employees, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2016, 7:27 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/wells-fargo-ceo-defends-bank-culture-lays-blame-with-bad-employees-1473784452
[http://perma.cc/ZR86-MSLU].
11. An Examination of Wells Fargo’s Unauthorized Accounts and the Regulatory Response: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 114th Cong. 5 (2016)
(statement of John G. Stumpf, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Wells Fargo & Co.).
12. Suzanne McGee, Wells Fargo Banking Scandal a Financial Crisis We Can Finally
Understand, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2016, 7:00 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/business/usmoney-blog/2016/oct/07/wells-fargo-banking-scandal-financial-crisis [http://perma.cc/Y3X4MZKC]; Maggie McGrath, How the Wells Fargo Phony Account Scandal Sunk John Stumpf,
FORBES (Sept. 23, 2016, 9:29 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2016/
09/23/the-9-most-important-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-well-fargo-fiasco [https://p
erma.cc/3S6K-472P].
13. Robert Evans, I Worked for Wells Fargo: They Made Us Do Some Shady Sh!t,
CRACKED (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.cracked.com/personal-experiences-2390-i-workedwells-fargo-they-made-us-do-some-shady-shit.html [http://perma.cc/28VC-VVEG]; Episode
728: The Wells Fargo Hustle, PLANET MONEY (Oct. 7, 2016, 9:55 PM ET), https://www.npr.
org/sections/money/2016/10/07/497084491/episode-728-the-wells-fargo-hustle [https://perm
a.cc/254M-Z7L6].
14. Evans, supra note 13.
15. Cowley, supra note 1.
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urged to promote “credit card accounts to use as overdraft protection . . . when [customers] were already struggling to keep their
checking accounts balanced.” 16
The bank’s sales quotas were impossible to meet, and employees
became frantic. They targeted populations susceptible to cross-selling tactics, such as elderly adults, nonnative English speakers, college students opening their first bank accounts, and small business
owners. 17 Bankers engaged in three fraudulent practices that became so routine they developed nicknames for them: “bundling,”
“sandbagging,” and “pinning.” 18 Employees falsely told customers
that they could not get one service without signing up for another
(“bundling”), waited to open up customers’ requested accounts until the next reporting period (“sandbagging”), and impersonated
customers in order to enroll them in online banking services (“pinning”). 19 Wells Fargo associates developed anxiety disorders, physical illnesses, and insomnia in response to the stress. 20 One worker
was so beleaguered, she became addicted to drinking the hand sanitizer kept around the bank. 21
Would things have been different if Wells Fargo employees had
been empowered to say “no” to their supervisors’ unattainable demands without fear of reprisal or termination? What if they had
been unionized? For one, thousands of employees might have
avoided the panic attacks and stress-induced illnesses that resulted from Wells Fargo’s “pressure-cooker culture.” 22 Likewise,
customers might have experienced the sense of security that comes
from knowing their money is safely held at the bank. But beyond
such benefits to employees and customers, would the unionization
of bank workers have forced Wells Fargo to rethink its approach to
16. Id.
17. Stacy Cowley, ‘Lions Hunting Zebras’: Ex-Wells Fargo Bankers Describe Abuses,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/business/dealbook/lionshunting-zebras-ex-wells-fargo-bankers-describe-abuses.html [https://perma.cc/CG44-NKD
D].
18. Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 12, Shaev
v. Baker, No. 3:16-cv-05541 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016) (noting that “widespread practices
even earned internal nicknames” from employees).
19. Id. “Pinning” gets its moniker from the act of assigning a personal identification
number (“PIN”) to a customer’s debit card without their authorization. Levine, supra note
9.
20. See Cowley, supra note 1.
21. Id.
22. Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18,
at 12.
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increasing profits? In short, could a unionized sales force have prevented Wells Fargo from getting away with its scams?
This comment explores the premise that bank worker unionization could serve as a much-needed check on the power of financial
institutions and the directors and officers who run them. Part I
overviews the reasons why big banks like Wells Fargo are incentivized to routinely engage in harmful and economically unsound
banking practices. It describes how a combination of inadequate
regulation and entrenched corporate governance norms allow
banks to ignore the interests of workers and consumers. Part II
outlines the potential that unions hold for constraining abusive
commercial banking interests. It recounts ongoing efforts to unionize bank workers, highlighting the Committee for Better Banks, an
alternative labor organization founded in the wake of the Wells
Fargo accounts scandal, and a recent organizing campaign by
United States employees of Santander Bank. In conclusion, this
comment argues that current threats to dismantle consumer protection enforcement and already minimal banking regulations urgently call for a new, worker-centered approach to holding financial institutions accountable to the public. Where the top-down
approach to bank regulation has failed, workers may be able to
regulate banks from the ground up.
I. THE TROUBLE WITH BANKS
How do banks like Wells Fargo get away with practices that
harm employees and consumers, as well as threaten the stability
of the global economy? This part examines two reasons for the abusive and economically unsound banking practices prevalent among
big commercial banks. Part I.A discusses the need for banking regulation and the inadequacies of the current regulatory apparatus.
Part I.B considers the lack of legal accountability for corporate directors and officers of banks.
A. The Threat of Failure
While perhaps exceptional in its degree of publicity, the Wells
Fargo scandal revealed abusive banking behaviors that are ubiquitous in the financial services industry. These behaviors center on
aggressive sales goals, which pressure banks’ retail sales forces
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into deceptive profit making by peddling unwanted services to customers. Unfortunately, current United States financial regulations
focus more on the types of assets banks are allowed to have than
what banks may and may not do. As such, bank regulations do little to curb banks’ harmful practices.
A quick scroll through the websites of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)—two federal law enforcement agencies
tasked with regulating financial institutions—reveals enforcement
actions alleging abusive and deceptive banking practices against
nearly every major commercial bank. 23 These agencies bring actions against banks for practices that directly violate consumers’
privacy and pocketbooks, practices that discriminate against certain consumers, as well as practices that skirt compliance with
other regulations designed to ensure the stability of the global
economy, such as data security programs and limitations on insider lending. 24
Most CFPB actions have targeted banks for selling overdraft,
credit card monitoring, identity protection, and insurance services
without customers’ consent. For example, between 2014 and 2016,
the CFPB ordered First National Bank of Omaha, Fifth Third
Bank, Citibank, and Bank of America to provide relief to their customers for illegal practices related to credit card add-on services,
including charging customers for unwanted credit reporting and
23. For an up-to-date list of the largest commercial banks in the United States, see
Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Large Commercial Banks, FED. RES., https://www.feder
alreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/ [https://permacc/Q94B-55AC] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
To find out if a bank has been subject to an enforcement action by the OCC, see Enforcement
Actions Search Tool, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://apps.occ.gov/EASearch [https://
perma.cc/M3N8-ZNBY] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). To browse the CFPB’s enforcement actions, see Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consume
rfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ [https://perma.cc/M3N8-ZNBY] (last
visited Dec. 1, 2018).
24. See, e.g., Press Release, Comm. for Better Banks, Santander Workers and Customers Unite Worldwide for Better Jobs, Trustworthy Banking (Feb. 21, 2017), https://betterba
nks.org/press/santander-workers-and-customers-unite-worldwide-for-better-jobs-trustwort
hy-banking/ [https://perma.cc/MT5T-NDMJ] (“Santander Bank’s home mortgage lending
discriminates against thousands of low-income borrowers and borrowers of color in cities
throughout the Northeast, including denying more than 26% [of] borrowers of color a mortgage loan.”). For the full report of Santander Bank’s discriminatory lending practices, see
COMM. FOR BETTER BANKS, DENIED: AN ASSESSMENT OF RACIAL AND ECONOMIC DISPARITIES
IN SANTANDER BANK’S MORTGAGE LENDING (2017), https://betterbanks.org/wp-content/up
loads/2017/03/Denied-Santander-3.15.17-REVISED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4SA-NUP7].
For a complete list of OCC regulations, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 1–199 (2018). For a complete list of
CFPB regulations, see 12 C.F.R. §§ 1000–99 (2018).
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monitoring. 25 Bank of America was ordered to pay upwards of $2
million to customers and an additional $20 million civil penalty. 26
Likewise, the OCC polices financial institutions that engage in deceptive sales and billing practices. In 2012, the OCC ordered Capital One to pay $150 million in restitution for using “high-pressure
sales tactics,” “unfair billing practices,” and making “materially
false, deceptive, or otherwise misleading oral statements” in selling credit card add-ons to consumers. 27 Other banks that the CFPB
and OCC have penalized include JPMorgan Chase Bank, TD Bank,
and PNC Bank. 28
All of these banks exploit their consumers by the same means:
deceptive and high-pressure sales tactics by the retail salesforce.
These sales practices can be found at banks around the world. Several global studies have found that bank workers “are overworked
and suffer from high levels of stress due to unattainable sales
goals.” 29 Researchers in Brazil have reported chronic fatigue, repetitive stress disorders, minor psychiatric disorders, and highrisk drinking to be common among bank employees. 30 Other studies have found similar health problems in bank workers in Ghana,
Nigeria, Kuwait, and the United Kingdom. 31 Bank workers’ in-

25. First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0014 (Aug. 20, 2016); Fifth Third
Bank, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0025 (Sept. 28, 2015); Citibank, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0015
(July 21, 2015); Bank of America, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004 (Apr. 7, 2014).
26. Bank of America, CFPB No. 2014-CFPB-0004 (Apr.7, 2014). Citibank paid $700
million. Citibank, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0025 (Sept. 28, 2015). Fifth Third paid $3 million,
Fifth Third Bank, CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0025 (Sept. 28, 2015), and Omaha paid $27.75
million, First Nat’l Bank of Omaha, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0014 (Aug. 20, 2016).
27. Capital One Bank, Enforcement Action No. 2012-152 (Comptroller of the Currency
July 17, 2012), https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2012-152.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2EUQ-GTUB].
28. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, CFPB No. 2013-CFPB-0007 (Sept. 18, 2013); TD Bank,
Enforcement Action No. 2013-142 (Comptroller of the Currency Sept. 20, 2013), https://
www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-142.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3F3-5LVW];
PNC Bank, Enforcement Action No. 2014-130 (Comptroller of the Currency Oct. 6, 2014),
https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2014-130.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RNW-95
VW].
29. Steven Payne, National Unions, International Capital, and Bank Workers, in
UNCERTAIN TIMES: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD 311, 325 (E.
Paul Durrenberger ed., 2017).
30. Id. at 326.
31. Id. (providing an overview of ethnographic studies on the health effects of banking
work).
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creased risk of mental health issues has been linked to the introduction of aggressively high sales goals. 32 In the United States, impossible sales quotas seem to be the industry-wide norm. 33
Why do banks around the world routinely take advantage of
their employees and customers? The most obvious explanation is
that greedy banking executives seek to increase their businesses’
bottom lines by any means possible. One angry shareholder accused Wells Fargo executives of pushing its sales policies “in an
effort to inflate and manipulate the market price for [the bank’s]
stock and, therefore, keep their lofty positions and increase their
own compensation.” 34 Such allegations are easily to believe, albeit
difficult to prove.
However, there may be a deeper, more systemic reason that big
banks resort to defrauding their customers. Counterintuitively,
banks themselves operate on unstable financial ground. In fact, the
widespread fear of bank failure drives much of the financial regulatory apparatus. 35 Common wisdom holds that because financial
institutions are so interconnected, the failure of even one could
lead to total economic collapse. 36 This has spurred the adage that
large corporate banks are “too big to fail.” 37
For banks, the threat of failure is tied to leverage. Leverage is
the use of debt as opposed to equity to finance a firm’s operations
32. See id. at 325.
33. Id. at 326; see also Jimmy Tobias, The Government Wouldn’t Rein in the Banks’
Predatory Practices—Until These Tellers Stepped In, NATION (May 8, 2017), https://www.
thenation.com/article/the-government-wouldnt-rein-in-the-banks-predatory-practices-until
-these-tellers-stepped-in/ [https://perma.cc/YTQ9-JRFP] (“[P]redatory sales tactics and unfair treatment of low-wage employees are industry-wide problems.”). Similarly, unattainable sales goals also contributed to the subprime mortgage crisis, often credited as the root
of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. See Payne, supra note 29, at 312.
34. Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18,
at 2.
35. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 430 (6th
ed. 2017); see also Heidi Mandanis Schooner, The Dogma of Capital Regulation as a Response to the Financial Crisis, in THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL
GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF SOFT LAW 59, 67–72 (Friedl Weiss & Armin J. Kammel eds.,
2015).
36. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 35, at 429–37, for a discussion of the systemic risk
that bank failures poses.
37. United States Congressman Stewart McKinney popularized the phrase “too big to
fail” to describe corporations, and, in particular, financial institutions, that are “so enormous and so intertwined in the fabric of the economy that their collapse would be catastrophic.” Eric Dash, If It’s Too Big to Fail, Is It Too Big to Exist?, N.Y. TIMES (June 20,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/21/weekinreview/21dash.html [https://perma.cc/
NXK2-25YG].
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and purchase assets. 38 Financial institutions are more highly leveraged than other firms. 39 The New York Federal Reserve Bank
reported that “[a] typical non-financial firm has equity that exceeds 50% of its assets. By contrast, in mid-2010, the median capital ratio of commercial banks was about 8.5%.” 40
Banks use leverage to grow, but leverage comes with a large
risk: insolvency, or the inability to pay back debts. 41 As such, leverage is “both the life blood and the death knell of large financial
institutions.” 42 Very high leverage, and highly leveraged banks in
particular, were strong contributors to the Global Financial Crisis
of 2008 (“GFC”). 43 After the blow of the GFC, while other commercial banks were struggling, Wells Fargo was a “rare upbeat tale
amid the banking wreckage.” 44 One wonders whether Wells
Fargo’s success had anything to do with its aggressive sales policies.
Banks use leverage for the same reasons that all corporations
leverage themselves, because debt enhances profits and provides
favorable tax treatment. 45 Leverage allows banks to rapidly build
their asset size beyond what would be possible through the direct
investment of their own funds. 46 Moreover, interest on corporate
debt is a tax-deductible expense. 47 Perversely, banks are further
incentivized to use leverage because they can borrow money more
cheaply than other firms. 48 This is because the government is particularly concerned with keeping banks solvent, either through
38. Schooner, supra note 35, at 61. There are different types of leverage, only some of
which are evident from looking at a firm’s balance sheet. Id. at 61–62.
39. Id. at 62–63.
40. Id. at 62 & n.8 (quoting Viral Acharya et al., Robust Capital Regulation 2 (Fed.
Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 490, 2011), https://www.newyorkfed.org/media/re
search/staff_reports/sr490.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SY3-LCJU]).
41. Id. at 59, 62.
42. Id. at 59.
43. ROBERT J. RHEE, CORPORATE FINANCE 187 (2016); Schooner, supra note 35, at 63–
64.
44. Adam Lashinsky, Riders on the Storm, FORTUNE (Nov. 21, 2012), http://fortune.
com/2012/11/21/riders-on-the-storm/ [https://perma.cc/UK97-LKCA].
45. See RHEE, supra note 43, at 185.
46. Id.; KATIA D’HULSTER, WORLD BANK, THE LEVERAGE RATIO: A NEW BINDING LIMIT
ON BANKS (2009), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/10224/530
440BRI0Cris10Box345594B01PUBLIC1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB2T-FQAW].
47. JASON J. FICHTER & HUNTER COX, MERCATUS ON POLICY: THE RULE OF INTEREST
DEDUCTION IN THE CORPORATE TAX CODE (2018), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/
fichtner_and_cox_-_mop_-_the_role_of_the_interest_deduction_in_corporate_tax_code_refo
rm_-_v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TS6-BLTH].
48. Schooner, supra note 35, at 62–63.
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special forms of insurance or through government bailouts. 49 Creditors lend to banks for less because the government all but guarantees them a bailout should they borrow unwisely. 50
In theory, financial regulation brings stability to this precarious
picture by preventing banks from failure before they need to be
bailed out. 51 But adequate regulation of large, economically important banks “remains an elusive goal” since the GFC. 52 While the
regulation of leverage is now the primary focus of bank regulators,
attempts to curb overleveraging have been largely confined to socalled “capital regulation.” 53 Capital regulation “constrains the
amount of a bank’s debt in relation to its equity” by setting limits
on how much debt a bank is allowed to take on. 54 However, despite
its goal, capital regulation does little to constrain banks’ addiction
to debt. Although capital regulation is meant to ensure that banks
have enough assets to keep them afloat, critics warn that trying to
guess how much capital is enough—and how much debt is too
much—is dangerously prone to error. 55 Existing capital regulations are widely believed to be “much too low,” with regulators routinely using their authorized discretion to impose higher requirements than the established minimum capital ratios. 56
Moreover, banks may be more than happy to comply with higher
capital requirements in exchange for fewer rules of other kinds. 57
49. Id. at 63; see also Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again,
42 DUKE L.J. 469, 477–90 (1992) (describing Congress’s “special bank insolvency regime”).
50. See Schooner, supra note 35, at 63; see also Emilios Avgouleas & Jay Cullen, Excessive Leverage and Bankers’ Incentives: Refocusing the Debate, 3 J. FIN. PERSP., Mar. 2015, at
6 (2015).
51. See id. at 64. For an in-depth discussion of the foundations of bank regulation, see
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Top-Down Capital Regulation, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 327, 330–33
(2016).
52. Schooner, supra note 51, at 327, 333.
53. See Schooner, supra note 35, at 64–67.
54. Schooner, supra note 51, at 327.
55. Id. at 327–28; see also Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Banking Reform Hasn’t Fixed Perverse Incentives on Wall Street: Ex-FDIC Chair Bair, PETERSON INST. INT’L ECON. (May 5,
2016, 2:00 PM), https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/banking-reform-h
asnt-fixed-perverse-incentives-wall-street-ex [http://perma.cc/DJB7-R5XT] (“Regulators
through [the GFC] decided what was risky and what wasn’t. And they were wrong, they
were completely wrong.”).
56. See id. at 328, 344–45.
57. Schooner, supra note 35, at 73–74 (“[W]e have capital regulation because the large,
powerful banks are willing to tolerate capital regulation.”); see also Jonathan B. Berk, Incentives and the Financial Crisis, INSIGHTS STAN. BUS. (Dec. 1, 2008), https://www.gsb.st
anford.edu/insights/incentives-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/ZM34-XUV9] (arguing that
capital regulation will continue to fail in the absence of a realignment of bankers’ incentives
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As opposed to capital regulation, “prudential regulation” seeks to
“protect banks from failure primarily by restricting entry into the
banking business and by regulating banks’ activities.” 58 Where
capital regulation simply caps the amount of debt banks may take
on, prudential regulation dictates what banks may and may not
do. As such, banks are willing to suffer capital regulation if it
means avoiding prudential regulation. For example, if passed, a
proposed bill in the United States House called the Financial
CHOICE Act would overhaul the majority of the protective provisions put in place by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), President Obama’s sweeping response to the GFC. 59 This would allow “large and small banks
to escape many Dodd-Frank regulations in return for holding
higher capital.” 60 A similar bill in the Senate aims to raise the
threshold for banks considered “systemically important” and thus
subject to stricter regulations. 61
B. Corporate Culture and Executive Insulation
Exacerbating the problem of inadequate banking regulation is
the American culture of corporate governance, which centers exclusively on the interests of shareholders and insulates corporate
directors and officers from legal liability. Bank executives act at
the behest of corporate shareholders, which leads them to make
profit-increasing risks that they may not otherwise implement.
Moreover, shareholders and bank regulators are unlikely to be able
to meet the legal standard necessary to effectively hold bank officers and directors accountable for their policies and actions.
A typical business law class teaches that shareholders are the
“owners” of corporations, while the board of directors and executive
with the public interest).
58. Schooner, supra note 35, at 64.
59. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Wall Street
Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform [https://perm
a.cc/7J99-SKGR] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
60. Rob Blackwell, No, the Senate Reg Relief Bill Isn’t Destroying Dodd-Frank, AM.
BANKER (Jan. 17, 2018, 7:00 AM EST), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/no-thesenate-reg-relief-bill-isnt-destroying-dodd-frank [https://perma.cc/CX8S-LB22].
61. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, S. 2155, 115th
Cong. (2017); see also Alan Rappeport, Democrats Add Momentum to G.O.P. Push to Loosen
Banking Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/15/us/politi
cs/democrats-banking-rules.html [https://perma.cc/X9D9-ULXQ]. Contra Blackwell, supra
note 60.
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officers are the managers. 62 All corporate directors and officers, including those of financial institutions, owe a fiduciary duty of care
to their firms. 63 Fiduciary duties aim to minimize “agency costs”
that arise from the unique relationship between shareholders,
whose money fuels the corporate enterprise, and directors and officers, who control the corporation’s operations. 64 Two common law
principles, the “shareholder primacy norm” and the “business judgment rule,” comprise the legal framework for corporate fiduciary
duties under United States state law. 65 Taken together, these two
rules ensure that, so long as directors and officers can demonstrate
that their motives were to generate wealth for the company, their
business decisions are largely immune from judicial review.
The shareholder primacy norm is an outgrowth of the American
model of corporate governance. 66 The basic premise behind the
62. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016). Delaware law is of particular importance to the legal analysis of corporations because more than 50% of United States publicly traded companies are incorporated there. Suzanne Raga, Why Are the Majority of U.S.
Corporations Incorporated in Delaware?, MENTAL FLOSS (Mar. 11, 2016), https://ment
alfloss.com/article/76951/why-are-so-many-us-companies-incorporated-delaware [https://pe
rma.cc/VN2J-JJF3] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also About the Division of Corporations,
DELAWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency [https://perma.cc/7NXC-N62A] (last
visited Dec. 1, 2018). However, South Dakota holds more bank assets than any other state
in the country, attributable to its historically “lax approach to banking laws.” Amy Sullivan,
How Citibank Made South Dakota the Top State in the U.S. for Business, ATLANTIC (July
10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/07/how-citibank-made-southdakota-the-top-state-in-the-us-for-business/425661/ [https://perma.cc/7RGR-Y3YY].
63. Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175, 180 (1995).
64. See D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 307–09
(3d ed. 2012).
65. See id. at 384–85, 361–62. Federal and state law embody two different approaches
to regulating corporate action. See generally id. at 309. Federal law focuses on directors’
adequate disclosures of information to shareholders, while state law focuses on the soundness of directors’ decision-making process. Id. at 323–25, 361–62. While the former puts the
power to regulate corporations in shareholders’ hands, the latter puts the power in the
courts’ hands.
66. See LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS
FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 15–23 (2012). There is debate
over the extent to which the shareholder primacy norm is enshrined in the law. See id. at
24–32. The shareholder primacy norm can be more accurately classified as a deeply entrenched business principle. See id. at 24–25. Critics of the shareholder primacy norm argue
that corporations would be better managed when held to consider the interests of all investors in the firm, not just shareholders. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Defending Stakeholder
Governance, 58 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2008). Employees, in particular,
“may be the best proxy for the interests of the firm.” Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers
in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 308 (1998). Similarly, many modern corporate theorists agree that shareholders do not “own” the corporation in any meaningful sense, given
that a variety of stakeholders contribute to the corporate enterprise in specialized ways. See
id. at 293–94.
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shareholder primacy norm is that corporations exist for the benefit
of shareholders, whose earnings and losses are tied to the company’s performance. The norm dictates that corporate directors are
obligated to make decisions that exclusively prioritize shareholders’ earnings. 67 While other considerations may be taken into account, such as an action’s impact on public welfare, all business
decisions must ultimately be justified in terms of their potential
benefit to shareholders. 68 This is particularly problematic for
banks, which, “like utilities,[] operate not primarily to generate
profit for their shareholders, but rather to provide necessary services to the public.” 69
The prioritization of shareholders’ wishes also directly contributes to banks’ leverage problem. 70 While governing a company with
debt can theoretically reduce agency costs by encouraging corporate managers to perform under pressure, 71 evidence exists that
highly leveraged banks take on excessive risk. 72 This is corroborated by the fact that banks dominated by shareholders’ rather
than managers’ decision making favor higher leverage. 73 As such,
high leverage creates “perverse incentives” for bank managers. 74
67. See SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 384–85. The most frequently cited example of the shareholder primacy norm comes from Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919). Henry Ford wanted to increase wages and modernize the manufacturing plant
for the benefits of Ford Motor Company workers. Id. at 671. The Michigan Supreme Court
famously rebuked Ford, stating that a “corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that
end.” Id. at 684. This remark, however, is likely dicta. STOUT, supra note 66, at 26.
68. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).
69. Schooner, supra note 51, at 331–32.
70. See supra notes 38–50 and accompanying text.
71. RHEE, supra note 43, at 185.
72. See, e.g., MARTIN KOUDSTAAL & SWEDER VAN WIJNBERGEN, ON RISK, LEVERAGE,
AND BANKS: DO HIGHLY LEVERAGED BANKS TAKE ON EXCESSIVE RISK? 23 (2012),
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/2253364/119729_391478.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YJ6K-6FM8]
(“Examining a large quarterly data set of U.S. banks between 1993 and 2010, we find that
equity is valued higher when more risky portfolios are chosen . . . but only when leverage
is high . . . .”).
73. Avgouleas & Cullen, supra note 50, at 7; see also Greenfield, supra note 66, at 308
(“Diversified shareholders prefer that the management of any particular company they invest in makes decisions that maximize the expected value of the results, even if the results
also are highly variable. That is, shareholders will tend to prefer risky decisions that may
provide higher payoffs but risk bankruptcy over decisions that provide lower returns but
have less risk of pushing the firm into liquidation.” (footnotes omitted)).
74. See Avgouleas & Cullen, supra note 50, at 2. Paying executives in stock options also
increases risk-taking behavior. See Martha C. White, $41 Million Is Chicken Scratch Compared to What Stumpf Earned at Wells Fargo, NBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:31 PM EDT),
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Leverage inflates short-term profits, which can lead to increased
performance-based compensation packages for directors and officers. 75 Interestingly, bank executives may not only be incentivized
to use leverage to get a higher paycheck, but also to retain their
positions. 76 Because shareholders overwhelmingly favor risk-taking, bank CEOs may “succumb[] to shareholder pressure” despite
their misgivings. 77
The complement to the shareholder primacy norm is the business judgment rule, which is “used by the courts to minimize the
number of shareholder complaints that receive judicial review.” 78
The rule, which varies from state to state, generally holds that substantial judicial deference is owed to corporate directors in evaluating their business decisions. 79 Delaware’s business judgment
rule creates a presumption that corporate directors have acted “on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company . . . . Absent
an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the
courts.” 80 The rule thus “focuses a court’s review . . . on the decisionmaking process rather than on the decisions’ content or results.” 81 Such deference is presumably warranted in order to encourage and protect directors’ abilities to take risks on behalf of the
company. 82

https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/41-million-chicken-scratch-comparedwhat-stumpf-earned-wells-fargo-n656901 [https://perma.cc/5NZJ-7Q69] (noting that giving
CEOs the chance to buy stock at below-market prices means that “they don’t actually lose
money if the stock price goes down instead of up”).
75. See Avgouleas & Cullen, supra note 50, at 4, 10–11 (“By assuming greater levels of
debt relative to equity and by the use of stock options in remuneration systems, top executives may increase their compensation levels.”).
76. Id. at 2–3.
77. Id. at 13–14 (noting that CEOs’ ignorance regarding risk taking is also a likely factor driving excessive bank leverage).
78. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 287, 297 (2008).
79. See Schooner, supra note 63, at 186.
80. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted), overruled on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253-54 (Del. 2000) (overruling Aronson
only to the extent that it suggested an abuse of discretion standard of review for an appellate
court reviewing the decision of a trial court on the business judgment rule; rather, the abuse
of discretion standard applies to the trial court reviewing the decision of corporate directors).
81. Schooner, supra note 63, at 186.
82. See id. at 184.
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The business judgment rule makes it very difficult to hold corporate directors legally accountable for irresponsible decision making. 83 Because directors owe no duty of care to the corporate workforce, collaborators, colleagues, or the public at large, it is largely
up to shareholders to check corporate power. 84 Shareholders can
enforce their rights by voting to remove problematic directors or
through shareholder derivative actions. 85 Such lawsuits typically
allege that corporate directors or officers breached their fiduciary
duties to the company, thereby losing the company money and
harming shareholders’ investments. 86 Shareholder derivative lawsuits are notoriously difficult to win thanks largely to the deference
the law affords directors’ decision making. In order to overcome the
business judgment rule, a board’s decision-making process must be
found to have been grossly negligent. 87 This gross negligence
standard is exceedingly high, having been met only a few times in
the history of Delaware law. 88 Moreover, corporations can write exculpation clauses into their charters, which entirely eliminates
care liability for directors. 89
83. SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 362 (“The potential liability risk from a breach
of [directors’ duty of care] is near zero in the corporate context . . . because of a powerful
effect of the ‘business judgment rule.’”).
84. In addition to shareholders, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”),
another federal regulatory agency, has the power to sue former bank directors and officers
in “professional liability lawsuits.” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2012); Professional Liability Lawsuits, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/ [https://perma.cc/ZQ5H-63BN]
(last updated May 5, 2018). However, FDIC lawsuits are only triggered by a bank’s failure,
and they are often settled, calling into question their deterrence power. Philip Shishkin,
Bankers Escape Big Penalties in FDIC Failed Bank Cases, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2012, 2:31
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bankers-fdic/bankers-escape-big-penalties-in-fdicfailed-bank-cases-idUSTRE81M1UH20120223 [https://perma.cc/L7V4-WPH5]; see also Professional Liability Settlement Agreements, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/ about/freedom/plsa/index.html [https://perma.cc/SP78-6UEM] (last updated Aug. 14, 2018) (providing
a list of professional liability settlements by state since 2008).
85. See SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 64, at 307–08.
86. Id. at 463–64. One Wells Fargo shareholder brought such a suit against board members in response to the accounts scandal. See Verified Stockholder Derivative Complaint &
Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 18. As of May 2017, the court denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss the case. Shaev v. Baker, No. 16-cv-05541-JST, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
68523 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2017).
87. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
88. Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Corporate Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 649–50
(2015). Since the development of the exculpation clause, Delaware courts have allowed duty
of care claims to proceed “recast as duty of good faith claims.” Id. at 701. However, gross
negligence is not enough to establish a duty of good faith claim, making such cases even
more difficult for shareholders to win. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,
65 (Del. 2006) (“Grossly negligent conduct, without more, does not and cannot constitute a
breach of the fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”).
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015). Delaware’s exculpation clause only covers
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Law enforcement efforts also seem to have little effect on bank
executives’ behavior. Civil money penalties from the CFPB and the
OCC barely register on banks’ bottom lines, which vastly outweigh
agency resources. 90 The fact that many banks are repeat offenders
reflects this power imbalance. For example, between 2011 and
2014, JPMorgan Chase paid a staggering eight separate multimillion dollar penalties to the OCC, four of which were over $300 million. 91 Similarly, between 2011 and 2018, Wells Fargo paid five
separate civil penalties to the OCC. 92 In 2015 and 2016, Wells
Fargo was the subject of two CFPB enforcement actions that had
nothing to do with the accounts scandal—one for illegal private
student loan practices and one for a scheme involving kickbacks
for marketing services. 93 In July 2017, it came to light that Wells
Fargo had charged at least 570,000 customers for approximately
$80 million in auto insurance that they did not sign up to receive,
causing many customers to fall behind on their car loans and, in
some cases, to have their vehicles repossessed. 94 In February 2018,
the Federal Reserve froze Wells Fargo’s growth until the bank
could prove that it has adequate internal controls. 95
directors (not officers) and only forecloses claims seeking monetary damages (not injunctive
relief). Id. In other words, with an exculpation clause, shareholders may win a lawsuit, but
receive no compensation.
90. See Davidson, supra note 6 (“The relative size of the two groups—the watchdogs
and those they watch—is fundamentally lopsided. The entire budget of the C.F.P.B. is a
little more than six hundred million dollars a year. Wells Fargo’s revenues are more than
eighty billion dollars. And Wells is just one of thousands of banks, insurance companies, and
other institutions that the C.F.P.B. is mandated to monitor.”). The FDIC also has the power
to issue civil money penalties. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(a) (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
91. Enforcement Actions Search Tool, supra note 23 (search “JPMorgan”; sort by action
amount high to low).
92. Id. (search “Wells Fargo”; sort by action amount high to low).
93. Wells Fargo Bank, CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0013 (Aug. 20, 2016); Wells Fargo Bank,
CFPB No. 2015-CFPB-0002 (Jan. 22, 2015).
94. Gretchen Morgenson, Regulator Blasts Wells Fargo for Deceptive Auto Insurance
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/business/wellsfargo-auto-insurance-comptroller.html [https://perma.cc/S759-ZUWG]. The OCC is considering sanctions. Patrick Rucker, Exclusive: Wells Fargo Faces Sanctions for Auto Insurance
Payouts—Sources, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2018, 1:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uswells-fargo-accounts-auto-exclusive/exclusive-wells-fargo-faces-sanctions-for-auto-insuran
ce-payouts-sources-idUSKCN1GR0G3 [https://perma.cc/S9WW-CZ73]; Mike Snider, Wells
Fargo to Refund $80M to 570,000 Auto Loan Customers Charged for Insurance, USA TODAY
(July 28, 2017, 5:38 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2017/07/28/
wells-fargo-make-80-m-refunds-570-000-auto-loan-customers/519355001/
[https://perma.cc/25N5-XDTL].
95. This amounts to “restricting the bank’s assets to the level where they stood at the
end of last year.” Associated Press, Federal Reserve Imposes More Penalties on Wells Fargo,
N.Y. POST (Feb. 2, 2018, 10:58 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/02/02/federal-reserve-imposesmore-penalties-on-wells-fargo/ [https://perma.cc/HQP8-HVNS].
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Law enforcement efforts are also likely on the decline. Between
2011 and 2017, the CFPB initiated approximately 200 enforcement
actions against financial services firms and returned an estimated
$12 million to more than thirty million consumers. 96 However, the
2016 election of Donald Trump put a crimp in the Bureau’s plans.
In November 2017, the Trump administration appointed Mick
Mulvaney as the new director of the CFPB. Mulvaney recast the
agency in a new light—one that exercises restraint and does not
“push the envelope.” 97 In Mulvaney’s first year, the Bureau initiated only two enforcement actions. 98 Shortly after assuming the
role, Mulvaney suspended a regulation affecting payday lenders,
as well as inexplicably withdrew a lawsuit against four payday
lenders that were charging up to 950% interest. 99 He also slowed
down the agency’s implementation of new rules. 100 Mulvaney, who
was a strident critic of the agency he now heads, requested zero
dollars in funding for the Bureau’s second quarter of 2018, choosing instead to drain the CFPB’s reserves. 101 Additionally, in June

96. Enforcement Actions of the CFPB, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ [https://perma.cc/XWF
7-736B] (filter from January 1, 2012, to the present date); Kevin McCoy, Trump Appointee
Seeks $0 Funding for Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2018,
1:18 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2018/01/19/trump-appointee-se
eks-0-funding-consumer-watchdog/1047642001/ [https://perma.cc/3QK4-Y4FP].
97. Alan Rappeport, Mick Mulvaney Calls for ‘Humility’ from Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/us/po
litics/mick-mulvaney-consumer-financial-protection-bureau.html [https://perma.cc/EPK9NMF8]; Gillian B. White, The CFPB’s New Mission, ATLANTIC (Jan. 25, 2018), https://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/cfpb-trump-mulvaney/551504/ [https://per
ma.cc/8XM7-XYQ5].
98. Enforcement Actions, supra note 23 (showing one action on Nov. 20, 2017, and one
on Nov. 21, 2017). Renae Merle, Richard Cordray Is Stepping Down as Head of Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/business/wp/2017/11/15/richard-cordray-is-stepping-down-as-head-of-consumerfinancial-protection-bureau [https://perma.cc/RH3E-JN49].
99. Michael Hiltzik, CFPB Acting Director Mick Mulvaney Seems to Think His Job Includes Taking Potshots at Elizabeth Warren, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018, 10:50 AM), http:
//www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-mulvaney-warren-20180228-story.html
(noting that Mulvaney closed an investigation into a payday lender that donated at least
$4500 to one of his political campaigns); Catherine Rampell, Opinion, How Mick Mulvaney
Is Dismantling a Federal Agency, WASH. POST. (Jan 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/mick-mulvaney-cant-legally-kill-the-cfpb-so-hes-starving-it-instead/2018/01/
25/4481d2ce-0216-11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html [https://perma.cc/RWS3-4FZC].
100. Gillian B. White, Mick Mulvaney Is Quickly Deregulating the Financial Industry,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/01/cfpb-goptrump/549755/ [https://perma.cc/R5PY-VD4X].
101. McCoy, supra note 96; see also Hiltzik, supra note 99 (noting that Mulvaney “has
been hostile to the bureau’s very existence, first as a Republican congressman from South
Carolina and subsequently as Trump’s budget director, a position he still holds”).
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2017, the United States House passed a bill that, if enacted, would
strip the CFPB of its ability to enforce laws. 102
Taken together, the theoretical and practical limitations of capital regulation, the Trump administration’s lackadaisical attitude
toward CFPB leadership, and proposed federal legislation paint a
discouraging picture for the future of bank regulation. 103 Likewise,
the perverse incentives inherent in profit-driven banking combined with the judiciary’s hands-off approach to bank directors’ fiduciary duties signals little hope for holding bank executives personally accountable for their actions. 104 Indeed, some argue that
the only way to achieve fair banking is to make banks public—in
other words, to remove the profit motive entirely—an idea that is
gaining increasing traction in cities across the country. 105
II. UNIONIZING BANK WORKERS
In the absence of genuine legal accountability for bank executives or a suitable regulatory apparatus, what can be done to curb
abusive behavior by hugely powerful banks? Borrowing ideas from
the world of labor law, this part proposes a worker-driven approach
to regulating financial institutions from the ground up. Part II.A
discusses the ongoing internationally organized campaign to unionize United States bank workers. Part II.B describes why and
how the unionization of bank employees would work to create a
publicly accountable financial services industry.

102. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Economic
Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, S. 2155, 115th Cong. (2018).
103. See supra notes 51–61, 96–102 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 62–95 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Meagan Day, The Shark and Hound, BAFFLER (Dec. 2017), https://thebaff
er.com/salvos/the-shark-and-the-hound-day [https://perma.cc/5JFH-LYZK] (“The only way
to fully take the predation out of lending practices is to remove the profit motive from financial services altogether.”); see also Adele Peters, The Growing Movement to Create City-Run
Public Banks, FAST CO. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/40512552/the-grow
ing-movement-to-create-city-run-public-banks [https://perma.cc/4DRU-N6RA]; FAQ, PUB.
BANKING INST., http://www.publicbankinginstitute.org/faq [https://perma.cc/W2PY-JDEV]
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018) (arguing that publicly owned banks benefit taxpayers and help
economically struggling states).
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A. Bank Workers’ Unions
Workers currently occupy a strange place in the American public
eye. On the one hand, public sentiment acknowledges the continued suffering of United States workers at the hands of technological advances and an increasingly globalized economy. 106 No small
part of the Trump campaign’s success centered on its rhetorical appeal to the struggling American workforce. 107 At the same time,
certain political and private forces are becoming increasingly hostile toward unions. Conservative think tanks, backed by billionaires such as the Koch brothers and the Bradley Foundation, have
lead a decades-long campaign to undermine trade unions throughout the nation. 108 While there is some legitimate basis for popular
concerns about union proliferation, such as corruption among union leadership, 109 internal documents from the Bradley Foundation
reveal that the true goal of the anti-union push is to “enervate
other progressive movements” by knocking down sources of the political left’s funding. 110
106. See, e.g., Chris Weller, President Obama Hints at Supporting Unconditional Free
Money Because of a Looming Robot Takeover, BUS. INSIDER (June 24, 2016, 3:01 PM), https:
//www.businessinsider.com/president-obama-support-basic-income-2016-6/ [https://perma.
cc/8C2J-R6ZC].
107. See Noam Scheiber et al., Trump’s Inroads in Union Ranks Have Labor Leaders
Scrambling, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/eco
nomy/trump-labor-unions.html [https://perma.cc/NW6J-WLR8].
108. Ed Pilkington, Fears Grow as Rightwing Billionaires Battle to Erode U.S. Union
Rights, GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2018, 1:00 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/
feb/24/rightwing-billionaires-union-rights [https://perma.cc/2EPU-JSYU]. For example, in
June 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that public sector employees who benefit from union
representation may nonetheless decline to pay union dues. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty.,
& Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). The plaintiff in that case,
Mark Janus, was represented by lawyers from wealthy rightwing groups the National Right
to Work Legal Defense Foundation and the Liberty Justice Center. Moshe Z. Marvit, For 60
Years, This Powerful Group Has Worked to Crush Labor, NATION (July 5, 2018), https:
//www.thenation.com/article/group-turned-right-work-crusade-crush-labor/ [https://perma.
cc/3FGA-YHCX]. Weeks after the Court’s ruling, Janus took a position as “senior fellow” at
the Illinois Policy Institute, a conservative think tank. Rick Pearson, State Employee in Major Union-Undermining Supreme Court Case Will Join Conservative Think Tank, Tour the
Country, CHI. TRIB. (July 22, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/lo
cal/politics/ct-met-janus-afscme-illinois-policy-institute-20180722-story.html
[https://per
ma.cc/TR5A-2BRT].
109. David J. Pryzbylski, Dirty Money: Report Shows Union Corruption Still Widespread, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dirty-moneyreport-shows-union-corruption-still-widespread [https://perma.cc/PG53-NNPS].
110. Pilkington, supra note 108. In both the United State and abroad, there is a weak
relationship between public approval of unions and unionization rates. JAKE ROSENFELD,
WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 14–18 (2014). Rather, declining rates of unionization are
linked to economic, institutional, and political changes with antiunion effects. Id. at 17–27.
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Thus, it comes as no surprise that “[g]lobally, the United States
is almost alone in its lack of bank workers’ unions.” 111 Only 1.2%
of financial service employees belong to unions compared to 10.7%
of workers across all industries in the United States. 112 Likewise,
efforts to unionize bank workers are scarce in American history. In
the 1940s, the communist-led United Office and Professional
Workers (“UOPW”) organized thousands of bank workers on Wall
Street, including a 700-worker strike at the Brooklyn Trust Company. 113 The UOPW was later destroyed by “McCarthyist purges”
led by the American Federation of Labor and the federal government. 114 In the wake of the UOPW, a more conservative union,
called the United Financial Employees, attempted to organize Wall
Street workers, but its strikes were unsuccessful. 115 Since then,
there have been “virtually no” attempts to organize bank workers. 116 Today, one of the only unionized banks in the United States
is Amalgamated Bank, owned by the Amalgamated Clothing
Workers of America. 117
Nonetheless, the American financial services industry is ripe for
unionization. United States bank workers face consistently low
pay rates. 118 According to a 2015 report, almost one in three retail
banking employees earn below a living wage. 119 As of May 2017,
the median hourly wage for bank tellers—the largest banking-related occupation in the United States—was $13.52. 120 By comparison, Wells Fargo’s new CEO made $17.4 million last year, which is
111. Payne, supra note 29, at 323.
112. Id. (citing Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: Union
Members—2017 (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/A7D8-25R4]). For international union density statistics, visit ILOSTAT at
www.ilo.org/ilostat, expand “Industrial Relations,” and select “Trade union density rate.”
113. Payne, supra note 29, at 323.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. Possible reasons for the failure of bank workers’ unions include the fact that the
United States labor movement has focused mainly on male-dominated industries, as well as
the decentralization of the United States banking industry and lack of publicly owned
banks. Id. at 323–24.
117. Our Story: A Legacy of Access, Affordability, and Advocacy, AMALGAMATED BANK,
https://www.amalgamatedbank.com/our-story [https://perma.cc/XC7C-9JLL] (last visited
Dec. 1, 2018); Who We Are, AMALGAMATED BANK, https://www.amalgamatedbank.com/uni
ons [https://perma.cc/XFN4-XJQW] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
118. Payne, supra note 29, at 325.
119. NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, A $15 MINIMUM WAGE FOR BANK WORKERS (2015),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/NELP-Data-Brief-15-Minimum-Wage-for-BankWorkers.pdf. [https://perma.cc/TT37-RX6D]
120. Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2017: 43-3071 Tellers, U.S. DEP’T LAB.,
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291 times the bank’s median salary (and which, notably, ranked
among the lowest pay packages for American bank CEOs in
2017). 121 One labor reporter noted that “the unionized janitors
working for contractors that clean Sovereign Bank’s headquarters . . . often make more than the bank tellers and personal bankers.” 122 According to a 2014 report, 31% of the families of bank tellers are enrolled in one or more public assistance programs—such
as Medicaid or food stamps—compared to 25% of the workforce as
a whole. 123
The United States lies in stark contrast to the rest of the world,
where bank workers in most European and South American countries, as well as many African and Asian countries, are unionized. 124 For example, the Union Network International Finance
Global Union (“UNI Finance”) represents 3 million finance and insurance employees in 237 trade unions worldwide—from Sweden
to Ghana to Lebanon—helping bank workers secure national sector-wide agreements that ensure members better wages and protection from unfair dismissal. 125 Brazilian bank workers, who are
heavily unionized, earn “substantially higher salaries than their
US counterparts.” 126 In many of the countries where bank employees are unionized, workers have also managed to negotiate such

https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes433071.htm [https://perma.cc/2TSB-K86P] (last visited
Dec. 1, 2018).
121. Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo CEO Made $17.4 Million in 2017, 291 Times Company’s
Median Salary, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 14, 2018, 5:55 PM ET), https://www.marketwatch.
com/story/wells-fargo-ceo-made-174-million-in-2017-291-times-companys-median-salary2018-03-14 [https://perma.cc/7U5R-8VDX]. For comparison, consider the worker-owned cooperative Mondragon Corporation, one of the largest business groups in Spain, where executives earn, on average, only five times more than low-level employees. David Herrera,
Mondragon: A For-Profit Organization That Embodies Catholic Social Thought, 25 REV.
BUS. 56, 61–62 (2004); Corporate Profile 2017, MONDRAGON, https://www.mondragon-corpo
ration.com/en/about-us/economic-and-financial-indicators/corporate-profile/ [https://perma.
cc/5WTR-CEHP].
122. Mike Elk, Too Big Not to Organize: SEIU International Coalition Try to Unionize
the Banks, HUFF. POST (July 29, 2010, 2:18 PM ET), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike
-elk/too-big-not-to-organize_b_663940.html [https://perma.cc/Q2D6-YSJT].
123. SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO ET AL., THE PUBLIC COST OF LOW-WAGE JOBS IN THE BANKING
INDUSTRY (2014), http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/pdf/2014/banking-industry.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X6B4-M9MZ].
124. UNI GLOB. UNION, U.S. BANK WORKERS REPORT, http://uniglobalunion.org/sit
es/default/files/files/news/us_bank_report_full_version.pdf [https://perma.cc/57WZ-FPJ9];
Payne, supra note 29, at 327.
125. Payne, supra note 29, at 327 (surveying benefits to bank workers who are union
members throughout the world).
126. Id.; UNI GLOB. UNION., supra note 124.
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benefits as paid maternity and paternity leave, paid holidays,
health insurance, and profit-sharing arrangements. 127
Despite the lack of bank worker unions in the United States, a
labor organization was instrumental in bringing the Wells Fargo
accounts scandal to light: the Committee for Better Banks
(“CBB”). 128 Comprised of bank workers (including some former and
current Wells Fargo employees), consumer advocacy groups, and
labor organizations, the CBB is a self-described “coalition” fighting
for “just wages, career paths and job security for front-line bank
workers.” 129 Recognizing the symbiotic relationship between workers and consumers, the CBB seeks not only to empower its members, but also the consumer public. 130 Since 2013, the organization
has arranged protests, released research reports, “crashed” shareholder meetings, and organized in workplaces across the country. 131 These actions led the group to Washington, D.C., where
group members lobbied high-profile politicians and CFPB representatives to take action against Wells Fargo for its abusive practices. 132 Less than three months later, the CFPB brought its first
enforcement action against Wells Fargo. 133
Amazingly, the CBB is only one small part of a much larger phenomenon. Recognizing that one-third of financial sector employees
reside in the United States, bank workers’ unions from around the
world have spurred an international effort to organize United
States bank employees. 134 Brazilian bank workers have been at the
forefront of the international bank workers’ movement. 135 In the
United States, the Communication Workers of America (“CWA”)
and the Service Employees International Union Local 26 (“SEIU”),

127. Payne, supra note 29, at 327.
128. Tobias, supra note 33.
129. FAQ, COMMITTEE BETTER BANKS, https://betterbanks.org/faq/ [https://perma.
cc/NG4Y-TNUG] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018); see also Elizabeth Winkler, Some of the People
Who Hate America’s Big Banks the Most Work in Them Every Day, QUARTZ (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://qz.com/548315/some-of-the-people-who-hate-americas-big-banks-the-most-work-inthem-every-day/ [https://perma.cc/ 73 EP-R6ZM].
130. See, e.g., Bank Workers, Sign Your Name to the Bank Workers Bill of Rights,
COMMITTEE BETTER BANKS, https://actionnetwork.org/petitions/sign-the-bank-worker-billof-rights [https://perma.cc/Z6BM-QPHH] [hereinafter Bank Workers Bill of Rights] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
131. Tobias, supra note 33.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Payne, supra note 29, at 313; see also Elk, supra note 122.
135. Payne, supra note 29, at 312–13.

CUSUMANO AC 532(6) (DO NOT DELETE)

756

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/31/2018 2:41 PM

[Vol. 53:733

both CBB affiliates, have lead the organizing efforts. 136 The international emphasis on United States banks comes from labor organizers’ recognition that antiunion opposition from the world of finance will be both strong and globally coordinated. 137 Moreover,
powerful United States banks have international subsidiaries.
CBB advocate Teresa Casertano explains that “when U.S. banks
go into other countries, they want to act the way they act in the
U.S.—in a nonunion environment.” 138 Thus, United States banks
that set up shop in other countries threaten to undermine years of
regional labor organizing. 139
One high-profile organizing effort in the United States revolves
around Santander Bank, a Spanish-based bank that is one of the
largest in the world. 140 Santander Group has locations in fifteen
countries across Latin American and Europe, serving more than
100 million customers worldwide. 141 In the United States, Santander operates over 600 branches across nine states and employs
more than 10,000 people. 142 Front-line bank workers at Santander
have reported low wages and managerial pressure to make
sales. 143 Call-center workers at Santander’s United States automotive lending subsidiary describe a “high-stress environment” characterized by unfair performance reviews and rigid call scripts that

136. Id. at 313.
137. See id.
138. Jack Smith IV, Bank Workers Will Protest to Form Their First US Union—and the
Whole World Is Watching, MIC (Feb. 17, 2017), https://mic.com/articles/168947/bank-work
ers-will-protest-to-form-their-first-us-union-and-the-whole-world-is-watching [https://perm
a.cc/ZZ34-E2NE].
139. This compounds with the fact that trade union density and collective bargaining
coverage are on the decline around the world. See Trade Unions, Employer Organizations,
and Collective Bargaining in OECD Countries, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., https://
www.oecd.org/els/emp/Flyer-Collective%20bargaining.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3FX8-7CA5]
(last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
140. Elk, supra note 122 (citing Santander as the world’s fourth largest bank by profits);
JahanZaib Mehmood, The World’s 100 Largest Banks, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELL. (Apr. 11,
2017, 11:37 AM ET), http://www.snl.com/web/client?auth=inherit#news/article?id=402236
98&cdid=A-40223698-11568 [https://perma.cc/V6JR-8B59] (ranking Santander eighteenth
globally for total assets).
141. Quick Facts, SANTANDER BANK, https://jobs.santanderbank.com/quick-facts [https:
//perma.cc/TV3K-4YMD] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
142. Id.; Santander Bank Locations, SANTANDER BANK, https://locations.santanderbank
.com/index.html [https://perma.cc/TV3K-4YMD] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
143. Press Release, Common Dreams, Workers Shut Down Santander Headquarters in
Mass Protest (Mar. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Common Dreams Press Release], https://www.
commondreams.org/newswire/2017/03/27/workers-shut-down-santander-headquarters-ma
ss-protest [https://perma.cc/LD6R-KMFH].

CUSUMANO AC 532(6) (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

REGULATING FROM THE GROUND UP

12/31/2018 2:41 PM

757

prevent them from better assisting low-income borrowers. 144 One
Santander worker explained, “We live in fear at Santander, and
without a voice . . . . When we have a union, we will have a
voice.” 145 Labor advocates recognize that Santander “continually
fail[s] to meet the same standards of worker and consumer protections as it does abroad.” 146 Outside of the United States, Santander
branches are, on average, 75% unionized. 147
Like many of its peers, Santander has been on the receiving end
of federal enforcement actions for using deceptive sales and billing
tactics. In 2015 and 2016, the OCC ordered Santander to pay two
multimillion dollar penalties, one of which was for charging customers for credit monitoring and reporting services that they had
not signed up to receive. 148 Similarly, in July 2016, the CFPB ordered the institution to pay $10 million for “deceptively market[ing] . . . overdraft service[s] and sign[ing] some customers up
[for overdraft services] without their consent.” 149 Santander is the
only bank in America that has failed the Federal Reserve stress
test—a Dodd-Frank mandated measure of banks’ capital 150—three
years in a row. 151 Additionally, the bank garnered criticism in 2018
for its role in Puerto Rico’s debt crisis. 152

144. William Hoffman, Employees Claim Santander’s ‘Stressful’ Workplace Harms Borrowers, AUTO FIN. NEWS (July 26, 2017), https://www.autofinancenews.net/employeesclaim-santanders-stressful-workplace-harms-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/46ZA-E7F8].
145. Smith, supra note 138 (quoting a Santander employee who wished to remain anonymous).
146. See Common Dreams Press Release, supra note 143.
147. Elk, supra note 122.
148. Santander Bank, Enforcement Action No. 2016-007 (Comptroller of the Currency
Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2016-007.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/S6W3-RYMN]; Santander Bank, Enforcement Action No. 2015-024 (Comptroller of
the Currency Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2015-024.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5NAG-S3H4].
149. Truman Lewis, Santander Bank to Pay $10 Million for Overdraft Service Violations,
CONSUMER AFF. (July 14, 2016), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/santander-bankto-pay-10-million-for-overdraft-service-violations-071416.html [https://perma.cc/V2TK-2G
SG].
150. Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/regula
tions/reform/dfast/ [https://perma.cc/D48Z-5SUN]; see also supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test).
151. David Henry, Santander, Deutsche Bank: U.S. Stress Test Repeat Offenders,
REUTERS (June 30, 2016, 1:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-banks-stressfailure-idUSKCN0ZG0DM [https://perma.cc/DP3N-CBAB].
152. See, e.g., Local Protests Denounce Santander Bank, LA VOZ LANCASTER (Jan. 26,
2018), https://www.lavozlancaster.com/news/local-protests-denounce-santander-bank/arti
cle_2b694296-02ba-11e8-916e-330e8dd60748.html [https://perma.cc/X8L8-96XR].
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In 2010, SEIU and CWA began an organizing campaign in Santander’s United States branches. As of 2017, over 15,000 United
States Santander employees had joined the effort. 153 In February
2013, bank workers from around the world visited New York to
stage protests at Santander branches. 154 In the following years,
employees organized various protests and delivered letters to the
bank’s executives demanding that they respect workers’ right to
form a union. 155 Santander has hit back against the campaign. According to labor activists, Santander fired three employees at its
Boston location for engaging in union-organizing activities. 156 The
bank has also claimed that workers’ protests are an attempt to “unfairly and inappropriately discredit” the company. 157 It is likely no
coincidence that in October 2017, Santander’s United States holding company rolled out a new “Inclusive Communities” plan, which
recognizes that the bank’s success is “directly linked to the prosperity of our communities’ families, businesses and neighborhoods.” 158 In early 2018, Santander raised its minimum wage to
$15 per hour—an increase that the bank attributed to federal tax
cuts. 159
While the efforts of the CBB and Santander workers are nascent, they are remarkable given the lack of historical precedent for
bank workers’ unions in the United States. Although American union membership rates have been steadily declining for years, 160

153. Smith, supra note 138.
154. Payne, supra note 29, at 324.
155. Smith, supra note 138; Tim Devaney, Bank Workers Protest Outside Santander,
HILL (Mar. 27, 2017, 1:24 PM EDT), https://thehill.com/regulation/325932-bank-workersprotest-outside-santander [https://perma.cc/RK28-QANX]; Press Release, Commc’n Workers of Am., Bank Workers at Santander Demand a Voice in the Workplace (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.cwa-union.org/news/bank-workers-santander-demand-voice-in-work
place
[https://perma.cc/ZN3Z-9JAY].
156. Elk, supra note 122.
157. Devaney, supra note 155.
158. Press Release, Nat’l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., Santander and NCRC Announce
$11 Billion “Inclusive Communities” Plan (Nov. 1, 2017), https://ncrc.org/santander-ann
ounces-inclusive-communities-plan-new-11-billion-five-year-community-commitment/ [http
s://perma.cc/D57B-YZY8].
159. Greg Ryan, Santander to Raise Minimum Wage to $15 Per Hour, N.Y. BUS. J. (Jan.
26, 2018, 10:41 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/01/26/santander-toraise-minimum-wage-to-15-per-hour.html [https://perma.cc/B9RD-ARAF].
160. Jordan Yadoo, Union Membership Rate in U.S. Held at Record Low of 10.7% in 2017,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 19, 2018, 3:05 PM EST), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201801-19/union-membership-rate-in-u-s-held-at-record-low-of-10-7-in-17 [https://perma.cc/3JQ
5-KW7W].
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continued fervent and costly attempts by rightwing groups to publicly discredit unions and undermine their financial support speak
to the power that labor unions hold for upending the status quo.
Bank executives are afraid of unions, knowing full well that a unionized workforce could threaten their exorbitant profits. 161 Even
though labor unions in the States face an uphill battle for financial
resources, support from political parties, and legal protections, 162
popular support for unions is steadily on the rise. In 2018, labor
unions faced their highest approval rating in the United States in
fifteen years. 163 Recent high-profile victories and innovative organizing strategies have led some to cautiously declare the start of an
American “labor renaissance.” 164
B. The Case for Unionization
In 2017, 16.4 million American workers were represented by a
labor union. 165 Unions represent workers across a wide variety of
industries, from healthcare to manufacturing to film production.
Most labor unions in the United States are members of two larger
umbrella organizations (also called “federations”), the AFL-CIO 166
and Change to Win. 167 These federations give charters to local union chapters, which include workers in the same workplace, region,
or business sector. To ensure that unions function democratically,
161. See, e.g., Financial Services: Industry Update, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH, https:
//www.huntonak.com/images/content/2/8/v2/2893/why_is_organized_labor_suddenly_takin
g_an_interest_in_americas_b.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FYP-TPS2] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018)
(warning financial services industry clients that “waiting to act until a union knocks on the
front door could easily be too late”).
162. See generally ROSENFELD, supra note 110, at 10–30.
163. Lydia Saad, Labor Union Approval Steady at 15-Year High, GALLUP, (Aug. 30,
2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/241679/labor-union-approval-steady-year-high.aspx
[https://perma.cc/D54L-YYG8]; see also Who Wants to Join a Union? A Growing Number of
Americans, CONVERSATION (Aug. 30, 2018, 1:20 PM EDT), https://theconversation.com/whowants-to-join-a-union-a-growing-number-of-americans-102374 [https://perma.cc/6BVS-UH
T7] (noting that 48% of nonunionized workers reported that they would join a union if given
the opportunity to do so).
164. See ROSENFELD, supra note 110, at 195; Lois Weiner, Labor Renaissance in the
Heartland, JACOBIN (Apr. 6, 2018), https://jacobinmag.com/2018/04/red-state-teachersstrikes-walkouts-unions [https://perma.cc/N6NQ-NH9F].
165. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics: Union Members—
2017 (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc
/C8RF-JNZF].
166. About Us, AFL-CIO, https://aflcio.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/78WT-2KL3] (last
visited Dec. 1, 2018).
167. About Us, CHANGE TO WIN, http://www.changetowin.org/about-us/ [https://perma
.cc/3B5C-N8XP] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
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unions are required by law to allow members to elect their representatives. 168 While models of union leadership may differ, 169 most
unions are governed by constitutions and bylaws that the membership votes on. 170
Labor unions in the private sector are protected by the National
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which ensures workers’ rights to
form and join unions free from the discrimination of their employers. 171 The NLRA covers all private employees except independent
contractors, agricultural and domestic workers, railway and airline workers, and most supervisors. 172 Workers need not be unionized to benefit from the statute’s protections—the NLRA also protects employees working together (called “concerted activity”) for
the “mutual aid and protection” of their coworkers, even if those
employees are not part of a union. 173 Workers who wish to join a
union may seek to be voluntarily recognized by their employer or
certified through a National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) election, both of which require a certain showing of employee support
for the union’s representation. 174
At the heart of the NLRA is collective bargaining, the process by
which union representatives negotiate with employers to secure
certain terms and conditions of employees’ work. Collective bargaining results in a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that
is binding on both the union and the employer, effectively becoming
the “law” of the workplace. The NLRA establishes that it is an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain about “rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.” 175 It is
through the bargaining process that unions attain higher wages,

168. See 29 U.S.C. § 481 (2012).
169. See Bill Fletcher & Richard W. Hurd, Beyond the Organizing Model, in ORGANIZING
TO WIN: NEW RESEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 37, 38 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds.,
1998).
170. See, e.g., SEIU Convention Documents 2016, SEIU, http://conventiondocs.seiu.org
[https://perma.cc/E357-YJZW] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
171. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2012).
172. Id. § 152(3).
173. Id. § 157; see also Protected Concerted Activity, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.
nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/protected-concerted-activity [https://perma.cc/2G6B-LSM5] (last
visited Dec. 1, 2018).
174. Your Right to Form a Union, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://www.nlrb.gov/ rights-weprotect/whats-law/employees/i-am-not-represented-union/your-right-form-union [https://pe
rma.cc/8XEB-HC59] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018).
175. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a) (2012).
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better benefits, and safer workplaces for employees. 176 CBAs last
for a set period of time during which the employer may not make
unilateral changes to the contract without union approval. 177
The NLRA has been called “perhaps the most radical piece of
legislation ever enacted by the United States Congress.” 178 The
statute is unusual in that it protects and empowers collective—as
opposed to individual—rights. Its stated purpose is to encourage
workers’ “full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing.” 179 Section 1 of the
NLRA recognizes the basic inequality of bargaining power between
employers, who are able to organize as corporations or other types
of associations, and employees, “who do not possess full freedom of
association or actual liberty of contract.” 180 The statute notes that
such inequality breeds economic unrest and “recurrent business
depressions” by keeping wages down and discouraging competition
between industries. 181 In making these observations, the NLRA
tacitly acknowledges the eternal motivation that drives commercial banks to become too big to fail: “that those with capital seek to
multiply it without laboring themselves.” 182
The Wells Fargo scandal perfectly exemplifies the power imbalance between capital and labor that the NLRA was designed to address. The Wells Fargo board of directors and upper management
stood together as a corporation while lower level employees had no
such organization amongst themselves. 183 While the bank’s directors and officers were shielded from legal liability for their business decisions, frontline workers could and would be fired for failure to meet their sales quotas. 184 Employees’ firsthand accounts

176. Importantly, unions may also bargain for a “union security clause,” which helps to
secure the union’s position by making employment contingent on union membership. See
LABOR UNION LAW AND REGULATION ch. 5.I. (William W. Osborne, Jr. ed., 2017).
177. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962). But see Raytheon Network Centric Sys.,
365 NLRB No. 161 (Dec. 15, 2017) (holding that employers are permitted to make unilateral
changes that are consistent with “past practices”).
178. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1978).
179. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Day, supra note 105.
183. Cf. Frost & Giel, supra note 6 (describing former CEO Stumpf’s unwillingness to
criticize or terminate former head of community banking Carrie Tolstedt even upon the
suggestion of the bank’s Risk Committee).
184. Tobias, supra note 33.
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from their time at Wells Fargo describe a dangerously stressful
and unethical work environment that they were unable to change
or challenge, despite their best efforts. 185 Finally, as forewarned by
the NLRA, the uneven power wielded by Wells Fargo management
eventually contributed to a global economic collapse.
Labor advocates have proposed that the dearth of bank workers’
unions in the United States has contributed to financial institutions’ widespread deceptive and harmful practices. 186 These organizers argue that unionized bank workers would be in a more secure
position to act as whistleblowers in the face of ethically dubious
directives from management. 187 Organized bank employees could
also negotiate rules regarding sales goals, such as those forced
upon the employees of Wells Fargo and Santander, in their union
contracts. 188 Moreover, higher wages for workers may provide a
check on executive bonuses that create perverse incentives for
bank directors. 189 While the public waits for legislators to enact robust “top-down capital regulation,” perhaps the employees of financial institutions, banding together, could regulate banks from the
ground up. 190
As the CBB has illustrated, 191 whistleblowing is becoming an increasingly important check on corporate power. 192 However, bank
employees risk being terminated for reporting unethical behavior
at work. For example, in 2017, the Department of Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) found that two
Wells Fargo managers had been improperly fired for reporting potential fraud to their supervisors and the company’s in-house ethics hotline. 193 Other former employees have alleged that Wells
185. See supra notes 1, 12–21 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Tobias, supra note
33 (explaining that one Wells Fargo banker “reported fraudulent activity to his superiors on
a number of occasions, but nothing ever came of it”).
186. Payne, supra note 29, at 312.
187. Id.
188. Id.; see supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text.
189. Payne, supra note 29, at 312; see supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
190. Payne, supra note 29, at 331.
191. See supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text.
192. See Gretchen Morgenson, Whistle-Blowers Spur Companies to Change Their Ways,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/16/business/whistle-blowerscorporate.html [https://perma.cc/EU6H-VAXD] (noting that federal and state whistleblower
programs are “increasingly seen as a way to help understaffed regulators enhance their
oversight of sprawling and complex corporations”).
193. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA Orders Wells Fargo to Reinstate SoCal
Whistleblower; Pay $577K in Back Wages, Damages, Attorneys’ Fees (July 21, 2017), https:
//www.osha.gov/news/newsreleases/region9/07212017
[https://perma.cc/7JXQ-EBKD];
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Fargo wrongfully terminated them for reporting unlawful and unethical business practices. 194 According to the Ethics and Compliance Initiative’s 2018 Global Business Ethics Survey (“GBES”),
American employer retaliation against employees for reporting
wrongdoing has doubled since 2013. 195 Retaliation may take many
forms, such as ostracism, demotion, reassignment, or relocation. 196
Employer retaliation often increases with each attempt that the
employee makes to report wrongdoing. 197
In theory, private-sector whistleblower protections, such as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”), make it illegal for employers to retaliate against employees who report misconduct. 198 However, whistleblower laws are often ineffective at facilitating reporting, protecting whistleblowers, and addressing underlying wrongdoing. 199 Whistleblower laws do not deter employers from retaliating against employees in the first place. 200 Moreover, many whistleblowers are unaware of the legal protections available to them
at the time they act and face inadequate access to legal counsel,
insufficient resources, and limited success in the courts. 201 For example, from the time SOX was enacted in 2002 until the end of
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor OSHA orders Wells Fargo to Reinstate Whistleblower,
Fully Restore Lost Earnings in Banking Industry (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.osha.gov/
news/newsreleases/national/04032017 [https://perma.cc/KB4T-M8VG].
194. See, e.g., Guitron v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 10-3461 CW, 2012 WL 2708517 (N.D.
Cal. July 6, 2012), aff’d, 619 F. App’x 590 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissing former employees’
whistleblower claims); Ann Marsh, Wells Fargo Ends Fight with a Whistleblower in FakeAccounts Scandal, AM. BANKER (Jan. 20, 2018, 10:13 PM EST), https://www.financial-plan
ning.com/news/wells-ends-fight-with-whistleblower-in-fake-accounts-scandal [https://per
ma.cc/7F7P-9ZSV] (reporting that Wells Fargo recently settled with former employee and
whistleblower Claudia Ponce de Leon).
195. ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, THE STATE OF ETHICS & COMPLIANCE IN THE
WORKPLACE 9 (2018) [hereinafter GBES 2018], www.boeingsuppliers.com/GBES2018Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KXR-BU7L].
196. PUB. SERVS. INT’L, CHECKMATE TO CORRUPTION: MAKING THE CASE FOR A WIDERANGING INITIATIVE ON WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 13 (2016) [hereinafter Checkmate to
Corruption], https://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/documents/research/en_whistlebl
ower_protection.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W8L-NL9G].
197. Id.
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2012); ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 149–50 (2012).
199. See Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later,
64 S.C. L. REV. 1, 21–38 (2012) (analyzing the shortcomings of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in
particular, but also acknowledging that empirical evidence on these points in the United
States in lacking).
200. See id. at 27 (noting that whistleblower laws fail to protect employees from retaliation).
201. VAUGHN, supra note 198, at 125.
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2011, employees won only 1.8% of 1260 SOX cases decided by
OSHA. 202 Other whistleblowers’ complaints are dismissed before
the courts can rule against them. Six years before the accounts
scandal broke, two Wells Fargo whistleblowers filed complaints
with OSHA. 203 After speaking with the bank about the allegations,
OSHA failed to investigate the terminated employees’ claims. 204
A bank workers’ union could better protect whistleblowers and
facilitate reporting. CBAs almost always stipulate that employees—who may otherwise be fired for almost any reason, or for no
reason at all—cannot be discharged or disciplined without just
cause. 205 These just-cause provisions may make employer retaliation less likely. Additionally, a union could help inform the whistleblowing process and assist employees in navigating whistleblowing procedures that may be unclear or difficult to access. 206 In
the event that a unionized employee is terminated or otherwise retaliated against for blowing the whistle, the union provides a relatively efficient and affordable mechanism for employees to pursue
remedial action. Most CBAs establish a grievance and arbitration
process for unfair discipline or termination. 207 While nonunion employees must exercise their whistleblower rights alone—figuring
out which enforcement agency to report to and personally shouldering the legal fees—union employees are represented by the union throughout the grievance and arbitration process. 208
Beyond strengthening whistleblower protections, unionized
bank workers could help prevent abusive banking practices from
arising in the first place. The GBES found that American employ-

202.
203.

Moberly, supra note 199, at 29.
Ann March, Unprotected: How the Fed Failed Two Wells Fargo Whistleblowers, AM.
BANKER (Aug. 14, 2017, 8:35 PM EDT), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/unpro
tected-how-the-feds-failed-two-wells-fargo-whistleblowers [https://perma.cc/L5E5-Z8V4].
204. Id.
205. See JOSH BIVENS ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., HOW TODAY’S UNIONS HELP WORKING
PEOPLE 15 (2017), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/133275.pdf [https://perma.cc/K8KP-GWFE]
(discussing union contract provisions); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS ch.
15.2.A.ii (Kenneth May et al. eds., 8th ed. 2016) (discussing collective bargaining agreement
just-cause provisions).
206. See CHECKMATE TO CORRUPTION, supra note 196, at 12.
207. See ELKOURI, supra note 205, at ch. 15.3.F.ii.
208. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 2 (noting that collective bargaining agreements provide employees with union representatives to protect employees’ interests);
ELKOURI, supra note 205, at ch. 18.3.H.i–ii (noting that each party in litigation generally
bears his own attorney’s fees and requests for arbitration reimbursement are typically denied).
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ees are experiencing increasing pressure from supervisors to compromise their work standards. 209 Such pressure leads to employee
misconduct and creates a workplace culture where “questionable
business practices are almost twice as likely to be accepted.” 210
This is precisely the dynamic that former Wells Fargo employees
described: supervisors pushed untenable sales quotas and threatened reprisal if goals were not met. These high sales goals have
become the norm in United States banks, as well as in banks
around the world. 211 Because employee workload is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining, a bank workers’ union would require managers to consult with frontline employees to establish
reasonable sales quotas and policies. 212 Workers fighting for a union at Santander understand the importance of “[e]nding quotas
that force workers to sell exploitative loans [to customers].” 213 Similarly, UNI Finance’s platform includes limiting the use of sales
pressure and targets, and ensuring that bank employees are “given
adequate time and resources to be able to provide all relevant information to clients.” 214
Finally, unionizing bank workers could force managers to reorient their focus away from shareholders and toward workers and
consumers. 215 The dominance of the shareholder primacy norm 216
209. See GBES 2018, supra note 195, at 8.
210. Id.
211. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
212. ELKOURI, supra note 205, at chs. 13.2.Ai.a, 13-10.
213. BIVENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 17.
214. Regulation and Policies, UNI GLOBAL UNION, http://www.uniglobalunion.org/sec
tors/finance/regulation-and-policies [https://perma.cc/28WC-98N7] (last visited Dec. 1,
2018).
215. Unionization is not the only way that worker involvement could check the power of
big banks—workers could also help run them. Legal scholar Kent Greenfield argues for a
stakeholder model of corporate governance in which workers have representation on the
board of directors and directors’ fiduciary obligations “run to the firm as a whole.” Kent
Greenfield, The Third Way, SEATTLE U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2014). European works councils
offer a robust example of worker representation at the firm level. See, e.g., L. Fulton, Workplace Representation, WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU, https://www.worker-participation.eu/
National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Germany/Workplace-Representation [https://per
ma.cc/V8Q6-4P89] (last visited Dec. 1, 2018). Though, for a works council model to work
under current United States law, it is likely that a workplace would already have to be
unionized. See Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1170 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that
“action committees” involving workers cannot be wholly created and maintained by the employer under the NLRA). Moreover, alternative ownership structures for banks already exist, both in the United States and abroad. One unique model comes from the cooperative
Rokin Labour Banks of Japan, whose membership is limited to labor unions and other workers’ associations. See NAT’L ASSOC. OF LABOUR BANKS, A GUIDE TO LABOUR BANKS (2011),
http://all.rokin.or.jp/english/documents/2011guide_E.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF3V-7T7Y].
216. See supra notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
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has shifted public companies away from “investing corporate profits in the firm or [their] workers to instead sending corporate profits back to shareholders.” 217 Before the 1970s, American firms paid
out half of their profits to shareholders while retaining the remaining profits for investment in the company. “Now, shareholder payouts are over 100% of reported profits, because firms borrow in order to lift payouts even higher.” 218 Besides encouraging excessive
and economically unsafe managerial risk taking, 219 the shareholder primacy norm leads to a decline in worker bargaining
power, lower wages, and higher income inequality. 220 Conversely,
unionization leads to industry-wide income redistribution. 221
Higher wages for workers means more money to spend as consumers, thus bolstering the shrinking middle class and strengthening
the economy. 222
While labor laws in the United States are far from robust, 223
most private employees, including bank workers, have a federal
right to form labor unions and collectively bargain. Organizing
even a fraction of the hundreds of thousands of frontline bank
workers in the United States could create meaningful changes in
banks’ sales practices and help to hold bank executives and managers accountable to the public interest. With an internationally
backed bank workers’ movement spearheaded by the grassroots
Community for Better Banks, renewed national media attention
directed toward labor actions, and steadily growing public support
217. Lenore Palladino, How Shareholder Primacy Hurts Jobs and Wages, LAW & POL.
ECON. (Apr. 25, 2018), https://lpeblog.org/2018/04/25/how-shareholder-primacy-hurts-jobsand-wages/ [https://perma.cc/T3DH-YSCS].
218. Id. (citation omitted).
219. See supra notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
220. See Palladino, supra note 217.
221. See BIVENS ET AL., supra note 205, at 8. For example, unions set a pay standard
that nonunion employers follow, raising wages for union and nonunion workers alike. Id.
Unions also lessen wage inequality across different skill levels and reduce wage inequality
based on race and gender. Cf. id.
222. Paula B.Voos, How Unions Can Help Restore the Middle Class, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.epi.org/publication/how_unions_can_help_restore_the_middle
_class/ [https://perma.cc/U3QB-J9CE].
223. For example, the NLRB has limited enforcement power and is forbidden from hiring its own economic analysts. See Investigate Charges, NAT’L LAB. REL. BD., https://
www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/investigate-charges [https://perma.cc/5PDX-PQEE]; Hiba Hafiz,
Economic Analysis of Labor Regulation, 2018 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). Likewise,
numerous restrictions have long been placed on workers’ ability to strike, such as the Supreme Court’s 1938 ruling that allows employers to permanently replace workers who strike
for better economic terms and conditions. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S.
333 (1938). For a historical overview of unsuccessful attempts to revise the NLRA, see
ROSENFELD, supra note 110, at 23–27.
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for labor unions, a unionized bank workforce may be closer than it
appears.
CONCLUSION
The American people saved bank executives from the financial
mess they engineered. Yet, these corporate chiefs continue to take
our money in the form of tax subsidies. They hold our pensions.
They are entrusted with our savings. The money Americans place
collectively in banks should secure the well-being and advance the
dreams of everyday Americans like you and me. We, the people who
help you open your accounts, deposit your checks, select your best
savings options and choose the right loans, are the bridge between
everyday Americans and the bank CEOs who see you as little more
than a dollar sign. We can play a critical role in ensuring fair banking practices and protecting our customers, and we’re raising our
voices to make sure we can serve precisely this role.
—Bank Worker’s Bill of Rights 224
Through deceptive billing and sales practices, financial institutions across the country are tricking their customers into opening
accounts and signing up for services they never wanted and often
cannot afford. In the fight for exorbitant profits, banks’ weapons of
choice are impossibly high sales quotas, coupled with the precarious vulnerability of low-wage bank workers. Knowing that sales
representatives and tellers are relatively powerless to resist supervisors’ demands, banks like Wells Fargo have instated sales goals
that lead to widespread customer exploitation. These practices
have resulted in the loss of hundreds of millions of consumers’ dollars and have pushed banks to the brink of collapse. The current
regulatory apparatus is unequipped to deal with the problem. Law
enforcement efforts do little to prevent banks from repeating their
bad actions. Holding bank directors personally liable is nearly impossible. Moreover, proposed legislation in the United States
House and Senate, as well as new leadership in the CFPB, indicate
a bleak future for more vigilant “top-down” banking regulation.
Where the traditional legal approaches are failing, the law
should look to the current bank workers’ movement for inspiration.
224.

Bank Worker Bill of Rights, supra note 130.
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While the financial services industry can seem hopelessly abstract,
its nebulous intentions are carried out in the everyday transactions
of bank workers across the country. Bringing bank workers together under the protections of a union could constrain the financial services industry in a variety of ways. For one, a unionized
banking workforce would create more robustly protected, and thus
more effective, whistleblowers. Effective whistleblowers would bolster law enforcement efforts by alerting agencies to unethical bank
action. Unionization would also allow workers to directly shape the
sales policies of banks by negotiating collective bargaining provisions related to workload. These provisions could, for example, prevent management from enforcing the kinds of reckless sales goals
that led to widespread fraud in the Wells Fargo accounts scandal.
Finally, unionizing bank workers would bring together two underrepresented and frequently exploited groups—low-wage workers and the consumer public—to create a powerful “ground-up”
counterforce to the financial status quo.
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